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Coastal resources in Tanzania have come under increasing pressure over the past three decades, which 
has led to a significant decline in the biodiversity and productivity of coastal ecosystems. The 
livelihoods of coastal communities that directly depend on these resources are consequently under 
increasing threat and vulnerability. Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are one tool for managing coastal 
and marine resources that have been increasingly used in Tanzania. Promotion of alternative income 
generating activities (AIGA) is often a component of MPA management strategies to reduce fishing 
pressure and address poverty concerns. However, empirical evidence on whether these AIGA are 
successful in reducing pressure on fisheries, or their impact on poverty, is scarce and inconclusive. 
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by investigating the linkages between household 
characteristics, MPA activities, and household choice of fishing gear. The empirical analysis is based 
on household survey data from a sample of villages located along the coast of mainland Tanzania and 
Zanzibar. We find that some aspects of poverty increase the likelihood of using destructive fishing 
gear. MPAs do not directly affect household choice of fishing gear. However, households participating 
in AIGA are less likely to use destructive fishing gear, suggesting that MPA support to these activities 
in Tanzania has a positive influence on household choice of fishing gear. We also find the use of 
destructive fishing gear is associated with higher consumption levels, whereas participation in AIGA 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Coastal resources in Tanzania have come under increasing pressure over the past three 
decades, which has led to a significant decline in the biodiversity and productivity of marine 
fisheries. The Tanzania State of the Coast report (2003) concludes that the inshore fisheries of 
mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar are over exploited and that shallow reefs are degraded. In a 
comprehensive review of fisheries studies in Tanzania, Jiddawi and Ohman (2002) report that 
the average size of lobsters and octopus has decreased substantially and the most abundant sea 
cucumber species are the low valued species due to overexploitation of these resources. Other 
investigations, such as interviews with older fishermen, confirm the trend in the decline of 
fisheries resources in coastal areas (MANREC, 2005).  
The coastal areas of mainland Tanzania are home to approximately 25 percent of the 
country’s population (about 8 million people), and approximately 1 million people live in the 
islands of Zanzibar. Most of the coastal population depend on these coastal resources—
particularly fisheries—for food and income generation. The poor tend to be the most 
dependent on these resources and are therefore the most severely affected when the coastal 
environment is degraded or their access to these resources is limited.  
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are one tool for managing coastal and marine 
resources that have been increasingly used in Tanzania and elsewhere.
1 This has followed 
growing consensus among scientists and fisheries managers that conventional measures, such 
as taxes, quotas, season length and gear restriction management, have failed to prevent 
depletion of fishery stocks and a new approach is needed (Smith and Wilen, 2003; Pezzey and 
others, 2000). Conventional fishery management measures have proved particularly difficult 
to implement in reef fisheries, due to the diversity of species exploited and few resources 
available for enforcement in developing nations where many of the reefs are located. MPAs 
have been proposed as a promising alternative for fisheries management, partly because they 
are perceived as a simpler mechanism to enforce and data requirements for effective 
management are lower (Pezzey and others, 2000). Interest in MPAs has also been sparked by 
growing concern about the environmental damages of fishing and desire to preserve areas in 
                                                 
1 We use the term MPA broadly to include any marine managed area, such as marine parks, reserves, 
sanctuaries, conservation areas, as well as collaborative management arrangements.    3
as pristine as possible state (Hannesson, 2002). Endorsement by a leading group of marine 
scientists of MPAs as an effective management tool to help protect and restore fisheries, and 
conserve biodiversity, by protecting some or all resources in specific areas from extractive 
use, further spurred the establishment of MPAs around the world (Scientific Consensus, 
2001). 
In mainland Tanzania, concerns with the growing threats to coastal and marine 
resources and degradation of coastal habitats led to the establishment of the Marine Reserves 
Park Unit (MRPU) in 1994, under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). 
MRPU has the mandate to establish and ensure sustainable conservation of areas of 
outstanding marine ecological importance and manage them in partnership with coastal 
communities on mainland Tanzania. Protected areas in Zanzibar are under different legal 
frameworks and institutions.
2 However, the purpose of the protected areas in Zanzibar, as 
stated in the Environment Act, are also to promote sustainable utilization of resources by 
those living in or near protected areas, as well as manage and protect biological diversity. The 
establishment of a Marine Conservation Unit (MCU), within the Department of Fisheries, to 
oversee and manage MPAs in Zanzibar is soon to become effective. 
Whether MPAs can simultaneously achieve the objectives of conservation and 
sustaining fishery catches has become a topic of considerable debate in the scientific and 
economic literature (Hilborn and others, 2004; Botsford, 2005; Hastings and Botsford, 2003; 
Carter, 2003; Smith and Wilen, 2003). Proposals calling for protection of 20 to 30 percent of 
oceans have led one to question whether such large scale implementation of MPAs can 
provide both conservation and fisheries benefits and what are the trade offs between these 
objectives (Hilborn and others, 2004).  The theory and models developed to examine the 
impact of MPA design on achieving conservation and fisheries benefits are still in their 
infancy (Botsford and others, 2003). Recognizing that MPAs are tools to specify the location 
of fishing, and that they do not affect the incentives or replace institutional structures needed 
to address over-fishing, suggests a more conservative approach be taken to promote MPAs as 
mechanisms to improve fishery yields (Hilborn and others, 2004).  
                                                 
2 Environmental issues, including wildlife and fisheries management, are governed by autonomous institutional 
and legal structures in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Both have considerable legislation and institutional 
experience with protected areas management, with similar overall objectives, but different means of 
implementation (Ruitenbeek and others, 2005).   4
In the context of developing countries, there is widespread concern that if the MPAs 
established do not benefit coastal communities, increased degradation and a decrease in the 
services provided by the existing coastal ecosystems may ultimately occur, leading to greater 
poverty. Hence, conservation organizations supporting MPAs in Tanzania, such as WWF and 
IUCN, are trying to address poverty in their conservation programs (Ireland, 2004). IUCN 
(2003) states that “it is unacceptable to carry out conservation activities in areas of high or 
endemic poverty while turning a blind eye to the needs of the poor people who live there and 
depend on the same biological resources that are often those that we wish to conserve.” There 
is also growing recognition that conservation is unlikely to be effective if users of resources 
are excluded from the decision making process (Ireland, 2004). However, some have argued 
that when conservation programs have become too diluted by strategies to promote 
community development and greater local participation in decision making, conservation 
objectives may suffer (Kramer and others, 1997; Brandon and others, 1998, Oates, 1999). 
How to balance the MPA multiple objectives of conservation and development is therefore a 
topic of increasing relevance for countries such as Tanzania. 
This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by investigating the linkages between 
household characteristics, MPA management activities, and household choice of fishing gear. 
We first look at which household characteristics determine the use of destructive fishing gear. 
In particular, are poor households more likely to use destructive fishing gear? And does the 
use of destructive fishing gear increase household welfare? Second, we seek to evaluate the 
impact of MPAs on the use of destructive fishing gear and household welfare. Do MPAs in 
Tanzania, through their efforts in enforcement of fishing gear regulations, education and 
awareness campaigns on the impacts of destructive fishing gear, fishing gear exchange 
programs, and provision of alternative income generating activities (AIGA), have an influence 
on household use of destructive fishing gear? Do MPA restrictions on access negatively 
impact households dependent on fishing? These are the questions this paper seeks to answer.  
The empirical analysis is based on purposely collected household survey data from a 
sample of villages located along the coastal areas of mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.
3 
                                                 
3 Fishing is not longer included as a separate economic activity in national population censuses and surveys. 
Although some data on the number of fishers is collected and published by the MNRT in their annual statistics,   5
Detailed information on the different types of fishing gear used by households was 
specifically collected in order to better understand the patterns of usage of different fishing 
gear and whether MPAs have an impact on these decisions. Tanzania has committed itself to 
increasing the percentage of its coastal and marine areas under MPAs to 10 percent by 2012 
and 20 percent by 2025 (Ruitenbeek and others, 2005). Knowledge of whether MPAs can 
effectively reduce fishing pressure by affecting the use of destructive fishing gear and how 
MPA activities impact the poor is essential to inform policy decisions to ensure coastal and 
marine resources are managed in a sustainable, effective, and equitable manner. We find that 
MPAs reduce the likelihood of households targeting near shore fish species and using 
destructive fishing gear. However, the latter impact is indirect and limited to influencing the 
choice of fishing gear of households participating in AIGA established by the MPA. We also 
find the use of destructive fishing gear is associated with higher consumption levels, whereas 
participation in AIGA does not significantly affect household consumption levels. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of fishing in coastal 
communities in Tanzania and the policies pursued in Tanzania to address problems in this 
sector. Section 3 describes the dataset used for the analysis, focusing on the characteristics of 
coastal fishing communities. Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy employed for the 
analysis, including the underlying theoretical framework and econometric specification 
adopted. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric analysis and section 6 concludes 
with a discussion of the policy implications. 
 
2.  Fishing and the role of MPAs in Tanzania 
 
Tanzania’s coastline runs approximately north-south and is dominated by three large 
offshore island—Pemba, Zanzibar, and Mafia Island. There are also other small islands, such 
as Misali Island, west of Pemba, and Mnemba and Chumbe islands, off Zanzibar. There are 
fringing and patch reefs along much of the mainland coast and these islands (Leon and others, 
2004). Tanzania’s continental shelf covers an estimated 17,900 km
2, with waters up to 200 
meters in depth. It is generally narrow—typically extending about 4 km offshore—except at 
                                                                                                                                                          
this survey with demographic data and detailed fishing gear usage data provides a unique opportunity for a 
detailed analysis.    6
the Zanzibar and Mafia channel, where the shelf extends to some 60 to 80 km (Ruitenbeek 
and others, 2005). Along most of Tanzania’s coast line, fishing is an open access activity in 
which anyone can participate.
4  
Most marine fishing activity takes place in the shallow near shore waters, using 
traditional vessels and gear. Table 1 provides an overview of the different types of fishing 
gear commonly used by artisanal fishermen in Tanzania. About 95 percent of the total marine 
catch is estimated to come from this type of small scale artisanal fishery (Jiddawi and Ohman, 
2002). Fishing is an attractive activity for the poor in particular, as it does not necessarily 
require the ownership of any assets and has very low start up costs. It also generates food and 
cash income on a daily basis. While most fishing households in coastal areas are also engaged 
to some extent in agriculture, there is less dependence on agriculture on the coast due to the 
lack of suitable soils for farming which is characteristic of certain areas where coral rag soils 
dominate the terrain. Fishing also provides some insurance for the poor as a fallback source of 
food and income in between crops or bad crop years, and during times of economic crisis and 
instability. Fishing is therefore a crucial activity for the livelihoods of many poor rural 
households along the coast of Tanzania. 
The number of fishermen in the coastal areas of Tanzania has increased over time, 
although reliable time series statistics are difficult to obtain due to the engagement of many 
part time fishermen and fluctuations due to changing economic conditions (FAO, 2000). 
Many fishermen in Tanzania attribute the increasing number of fishermen as one of the major 
causes of declines in fish catches (MANREC, 2005; Leon and others, 2004).  They also cite 
the lack of vessels and gear to fish offshore as reasons for over exploitation of near shore reef 
fisheries. The lack of fishing gear, many fishermen say, also leads them to resort to cheap but 
destructive fishing practices (Leon and others, 2004). Many illegal fishing methods, such as 
dynamite or poison fishing, spear gun fishing, beach seine nets, drag nets, and gill nets with 
small mash sizes, are still used due to inadequate enforcement of existing fishing regulations.  
 
                                                 
4 As of 2002, only 12 industrial vessels were licensed to fish in Tanzania’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
although additional vessels were known to fish in the EEZ illegal. Improved efforts to regulate EEZ fisheries, 
through monitoring, control and surveillance activities, have yielded valuable information on the potential value 
of fishery resources in the EEZ.  7 
Table 1.  Types of fishing gear used by artisanal fishermen in Tanzania 
Type of Gear  Associated Gears  Comments 
Gillnets 
(Jarife) 
Drift gillnet, demersal 
gillnet, shark nets 
Used in tidal, sub-tidal, and reef areas to capture fish moving with the tides. Target species are tuna, 
billfish, kingfish, and sharks. Have high incidental capture of turtles and dolphins.  
Seine nets 
(Nyavu) 
Purse seine, ring net, 
beach/boat seine 
Use light to attract pelagic fish on moonless nights. They are usually dragged onto the beach.  Beach 
seine is illegal in Zanzibar and only permitted in uninhabited islets.  
Drag nets 
(Kavogo Kigumi) 
Any seine net can be used as 
a drag net 
This method is illegal. Nets may be assisted by divers to untangle, chase, and retain fish. Nets are set 
from a boat or from the beach. May use two vessels, and run nets on the bottom. 
Cast nets 
(Kimia) 
  Used in sheltered areas. A circular net that is thrown over a shoal of fish or allowed to sink to the 
bottom. Closed when retrieved. Caches small fish such as eels, catfish, mullet, silver biddy, and shrimps. 
Scoop nets  
(Senga) 
  Used in catching small pelagic fish in the light attracting fishery. Mean catch rate is 60 kg per boat per 
day. 
Basket traps   Dema (large basket), towe 
(small basket) 
Hexagonal in shape with a single opening. Traps are usually set in seagrass beds, among wild or cultured 
seaweed, or coral reefs. The dema mean catch rate is 1-2 kg per trap.  
Fixed traps 
 
Weir, fence, uzio, wando  Usually made of mangrove stick or palm frond midrib. They are semi-permanent stake tropes that are set 
in intertidal areas especially in sheltered areas. Catch rate varies from 12-100 kg per trap. 
Handline  
(Mshipi) 
  Probably found on every fishing vessel. Can be used from a vessel or from shore. Currently important as 
a sport fishery in the tourist industry at several fishing sites. 
Longlines 
(Dhulumati) 
Surface long line, bottom 
long line 
Mostly for catching tuna especially by industrial vessels in offshore waters. Used by artisanal fishermen 
for catching demersal fish.  
Troll lines  
(Kurambaza) 
  Lines are usually tailed by a vessel near the surface or at certain depth and use natural or artificial lures 
to target specific species, such as tuna and mackarel. 
Spear, stick 
(Mkuki, kijiti) 
Used for octopus fishing  A spear is made up of a stick with a sharp end or a piece of iron is inserted at the tip. Kijiti is a stick. 
Collection is done by diving or on exposed reefs. Catch rate of 4-7 kg/person/day.  
Harpoons 
(Bunduki, mshare) 
Spear gun, used by skin or 
scuba divers 




  These practices are illegal and have been banned because they not only kill target fish, but also other 
fish, shellfish, and coral in the area. These methods are particularly harmful to larvae and juvenile 
organisms.  
Source: Adapted from Jiddawi and Ohman (2002)8 
 
MPAs in Tanzania 
As of mid-2004, mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar included 1,380 km
2 of MPAs and other 
marine managed areas, amounting to just fewer than 4 percent of the country’s territorial seas. 
Tanzania is committed to increase the percentage of its coastal and marine areas under protection 
to 10 percent by 2012 and 20 percent by 2025 (Ruitenbeek and others, 2005). Table 2 provides 
an overview of the different MPAs in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar. Table 2 shows that 
Tanzania has adopted a variety of management models as its experience with management of 
marine resources grows. MPAs, broadly defined as the term is in the context of Tanzania, are 
emerging as the key mechanism for conservation of the marine environment and management of 
resource use in Tanzania. Increasing, the vision of the MPRU has turned to promoting 
“collaborative management and cooperation of user communities, local government authority, 
NGOs, and private sector agencies to contribute and share the responsibility in the management 
of protected areas” (Rumisha, 2005).  
Under this approach, a collaborative fisheries management area, such as the one recently 
established in Bagamoyo, is also considered an MPA. Through the establishment of collaborative 
fisheries management areas, communities are given a role in protecting and establishing rules for 
use of natural resources in specified areas. The areas to be managed are being selected by 
villages after a participatory ecological assessment of coral reef sites, which involved local 
fishermen, district fisheries officers, as well as the private sector participants, such as hotel 
owners. Mapping of the reefs earmarked for closure by villages participating in the collaborative 
fisheries management area is being undertaken to provide village fishermen with guidance 
during their fishing expeditions (TCMP, 2005). The management activities, which include 
enforcement of gear restrictions and patrolling of closed fishing areas, is supported through the 
enactment of village and district by-laws. Joint patrols by village environmental committees and 
district fisheries are officers are then carried out on a regular basis. In the past, even the Navy has 
been involved in patrolling efforts in the Tanga district, which led to a substantial decline in 
destructive fishing practices in the area (Makoloweka and Kalombo, 2005).  
The extent of community participation in the development of fishing regulations within a 
managed or protected area and in the enforcement of these regulations varies between different 
MPAs, but even more formal MPAs (such as the Mafia Island Marine Park) in Tanzania are   9
moving towards a more participatory and adaptive management approach, as described above. It 
is believed that community participation, through input in the development of fishing regulations 
and joint patrol operations, enhances compliance with such rules and reduces enforcement costs 
(Makoloweka and Kalombo, 2005). 
In this paper we focus on the use of destructive fishing gear, which has been identified as 
one of the most critical issues facing MPAs in Tanzania (Kazimoto, 2005; Makoloweka and 
Kalombo, 2005; Rumisha, 2005). This is the case even in areas such as Tanga and Mafia, where 
efforts to address the use of destructive fishing gear has been taking place for a decade. The 
Mafia Island Marine Park, for example, has implemented a fishing gear exchange program which 
has phased out 4 out of 18 seine net fishing groups and provided loans to 6 other fishing groups 
to facilitate the exchange of more sustainable fishing gear. The Mafia Island Marine Park has 
facilitated the formation of village enforcement units, training and providing equipment to such 
units, which carried 191 patrols in 2003. The Mafia Island Marine Park police and fisheries 
authorities apprehend 27 fishers without licenses or who are fishing in prohibited zones of the 
park, and confiscated illegal fishing gear in 5 instances in 2003 (Kazimoto, 2005). However, 
apprehended fishers are not always prosecuted in the legal courts or forced to pay the established 
fines. There have also been instances of reprisals against marine park police and community 
members who report illegal fishing activities to authorities.  
MPAs in Tanzania have also being engaged in a number of other activities to address the 
threats of over exploitation and destructive fishing practices, in addition to monitoring and 
patrolling of illegal fishing activity. Some MPAs in Tanzania have sought to reduce pressure on 
inshore fisheries by promoting offshore fishing. These MPAs promote deep sea line fishing with 
lights and use of fish aggregating devices. Promotion of alternative income generating activities 
(AIGA) is also an integral component of MPA management strategies to reduce fishing pressure 
and address poverty concerns. The idea driving the promotion of AIGA is to create an incentive 
for resource users to stop unsustainable resource dependent income generating activities and 
move into other activities which are non-resource based or at least exploit resources on a more 
sustainable basis. For this strategy to work, AIGA must be more economically profitable than 
unsustainable practices. However, profitability is not the only factor. An extensive review of 
alternative livelihood strategies for coastal communities in the Western Indian Ocean, also points   10
to the importance of factors such as attitudes toward risk, access to assets, vulnerability, and 
institutional influences, in determining household livelihood strategies (Ireland, 2004). 
Case study evidence exists from specific project experience showing that new sources of 
employment and income can be created as a result of efforts to promote these AIGA (Ireland, 
2004). Tanzania indeed has already had some successful experience with the introduction of 
AIGA in coastal areas. Activities such as handicrafts, beekeeping, and seaweed farming at the 
MIMP generate income of about US$10 per day for participating members (Ruitenbeek and 
others, 2005). Programs in Tanga have promoted organic vegetable gardening to fulfill the 
untapped high demand for vegetables in local markets. While so far the number of households 
involved in this vegetable growing pilot is small and the amount of income generated not enough 
to completely disengage households from fishing activities, the potential for profitable scaling up 
is significant given market demand for vegetables in the area (Ireland, 2004).  
However, the empirical evidence on whether or not these AIGA, and other MPAs 
activities generally, are successful in reducing pressure on fisheries is scarce and shows mixed 
impacts. A comparative study of costal resource management in the Pacific islands found that 
most AIGA have not been successful in reducing pressure on coastal resources (World Bank, 
1999). By contrast, an analysis of MPAs in the Philippines shows that integrating conservation 
with promotion of livelihood opportunities is a significant factor explaining MPA’s success 
(Pollnac and others, 2001). As Tanzania embarks in its commitments to expand protection of 
coastal and marine environment through the use of MPAs, it is important to assess the impact of 
existing MPAs. This paper seeks to fill the knowledge gap on the determinants of destructive 
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Table 2: Characteristics of marine protected areas in Tanzania  









     
Dar es Salaam Marine 
Reserves System 
26.0  1975  Comprises of 4 islands, designated as Marine 
Reserves in 1975, and placed under the mandate of 
MPRU in 1998. 
Mafia Island Marine Park  615 
 
1995  Multiple use marine park with zoning  
(822 km
2 total area). 
Tanga Collaborative 
Fisheries Management Area 
 
26.4  1996-2000  Covers coastal areas of three districts.  Set up as 
joint initiatives between local communities and 
districts and includes closed reefs and the Maziwe 
Island Marine Reserve (est. 1981, 2.6 km
2). Total 
area under management is about 1,603 km
2, of 
which 29 km
2 is no-take. 
Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma 
Estuary Marine Park 
 
200  2000  Total area under management is 650 km
2. 
Bagamoyo Collaborative 
Fisheries Management Area 
tbd  2005  Initiated in 2004 in Bagamoyo district, seven 
villages have established a collaborative fisheries 
management area and are in the process of making 




     
Chumbe Island Coral 
Sanctuary  
 
0.3  1994  Management delegated to a private company. All 
no-take.  
Menai Bay Conservation 
Area 
 
470  1997  A community-managed MPA. 
Misali Island Marine 
Conservation Area 
21.6  1998  An NGO and community-managed MPA, total area 
of 23 km
2 includes terrestrial; 1.4 km
2 is no-take 
zone. 




0.15  2002  Currently all a no-take zone, privately managed 
MPA by the Conservation Corporation Africa. 
Ngezi Forest Reserve  
 
14.4  1959  Proposed for re-designation as a Nature Reserve; 
includes mangroves and beach area. 
Jozani Chwaka Bay 
Conservation Area 
 
  2004  A pilot ICM site and protected forest area, 
Zanzibar’s first national park. 
Notes:  
* The Date Established normally shows the date that the sub-tidal area was included; some sites that include land were 
designated as terrestrial protected areas earlier.  
** Mnemba Island Marine Conservation Area is to expand beyond the current no-take zone to include wider area under 
management. It will extend from Nungwi (north of Unguja) to Chwaka Bay, through Mnemba, Kiwengwa, Marumbi, 
Charawe, Michamvi and Ukongoroni 
Source: Adapted from Ruitenbeek and others, (2005)    12
3.  The Data 
We examine the linkages between poverty, MPA activities, and household choice of 
fishing gear using household survey data collected at six sites along the coast of mainland 
Tanzania and Zanzibar: five with existing MPAs (Tanga, Mafia Island, Menai Bay, Jozani-
Chwaka Bay, and Misali Island) and one where a new MPA has been proposed (Kilwa). Each 
site has ecologically important and diverse marine and coastal habitats which coastal 
communities depend on for their livelihoods, including coral reefs, mangrove forests, and 
seagrass beds. Four of the MPAs are legally designated protected areas and one MPA is 
protected by community based management and locally approved resource management plans. 
These MPAs were established to protect resources and halt resource overexploitation and 
destructive fishing practices and all are involved in a number of management actions such as 
community-based planning, environmental monitoring, enforcement of fisheries regulations, and 
coral and mangrove conservation activities. These MPAs are also involved in various community 
development activities such as environmental education, alternative livelihood development, 
ecotourism, micro loans, and receive external financial and technical assistance.
5  
Four villages in each site of the six study sites were selected in consultation with local 
and national level authorities, and MPA project staff. Criteria in the selection of villages included 
the proximity to the protected area, community involvement in conservation, and importance of 
coastal and marine resources. One village outside the MPA was selected at each site for 
comparison purposes. A total of 749 households were surveyed in 24 villages. Random sampling 
at the village level was used to pick households for the survey, to ensure a diversity of 
households in the sample and avoid systematic bias.  
The primary instruments for data collection were household and focus group surveys. 
Both surveys were developed following a review of guidelines on socioeconomic assessment of 
MPAs and coral reef management. Prior to the field work, the survey questionnaires were tested 
to improve or eliminate questions that were confusing or difficult for respondents to answer. The 
household questionnaires covered information on: household composition and characteristics, 
economic activities, physical assets, expenditures, food security, education and health, markets, 
credits and savings, social capital, knowledge and participation in MPA activities, and 
                                                 
5 Technical and management assistance includes: IUCN in Tanga Region, WWF on Mafia Island and Menai Bay, 
and CARE Tanzania in Jozani-Chwaka Bay and on Pemba Island.   13
perceptions of change due to MPAs. The survey also collected detailed information on the 
different types of fishing gear used by households. A more detailed discussion of the fishing 
related information collected through this survey is presented next. 
 
Coastal community characteristics 
 
Most coastal communities are relatively isolated and lack access to infrastructure—roads, 
communications, electricity, and other services. For these communities, fishing is an important 
economic activity—for both subsistence and income generation purposes. Fishing is the primary 
occupation and source of income for 32 percent of households in our sample, second to farming, 
which comprises of 40 percent of households. Households employed in the government, private 
sector, or other organizations constitute about 10 percent of our sample. Households involved in 
trading or other self-employment activities account for 6 percent of the sample households 
interviewed, and other or not employed households make up 11 percent of our sample. However, 
some households not declaring fishing as their main occupation may be involved in fishing on a 
part time basis. Indeed 56 percent of households report participating in fishing to some extent.  
As Table 3 shows, fishing households in coastal Tanzania harvest a variety of marine 
species, which include reef, sandy-bottom, estuarine, and pelagic fish, as well as crustaceans 
(lobsters and crabs), mollusks (oysters and other shellfish), and sea cucumbers. The coral reef 
fishes are the most abundantly harvested resource because they are easily accessible to the 
traditional fishermen, which fish in the near shore coastal waters using a dugout or outrigger 
canoe. Other important species for the poor are the octopus, sea cucumbers, squid, crabs, and 
other estuarine and mangrove organisms, which are usually gathered on foot in the littoral zone 
by women, children and older men. 
Harvested species composition varies with the type of fishing gear, technique used, and 
location of fishing. Different fishing vessels and fishing gear are used for catching different types 
of fish (Jiddawi and Ohman, 2002). In our sample, the most common fishing vessels used are 
dugout canoes (34 percent) and outrigger canoes (21 percent). Only 24 percent of household 
engaged in fishing report using a dhow, large boat or engine powered boat. Roughly a fifth of the 
households do not use any fishing vessel, fishing on foot on the beaches or along the intertidal 
zones during low tides. Of those households using dugout or outrigger canoes, only a third of   14
these households own or co-own the canoes they use.  For the dhows, large or engine boats, the 
percentage of households that own or co-own these types of vessels range from 12 to 16 percent. 
Hence a large majority of fishing households are limited to fishing in the near shore waters.  
Households use a variety of fishing gear, and frequently more than just one type of gear. 
The most frequently used fishing gears are hook and line fishing (33 percent) and gillnets (26 
percent). Seine nets, of small and large mesh size, are used by 10 percent of households. Other 
types of nets, ring nets, scoop nets, and cast nets, account for another 14 percent of the fishing 
gear used by households in our sample. Again, a majority of households do not own the fishing 
gear they use. Only half own or co-own the hooks and fishing line they use, and fewer than a 
third own or co-won the gillnets they use. Ownership rates for other types of fishing gear are 
even lower.  
Much of the pressure on fisheries and degradation of reef ecosystems in coastal Tanzania 
has been attributed to the use of fishing gear and techniques that are destructive (Jiddawi and 
Ohman, 2002). Dynamite fishing is one particularly destructive fishing method which has been 
practiced in Tanzania for over 40 years. Each blast of dynamite kills all fish and most other 
living organisms in a 15-20 meter radius and completely destroys the reef habitat within a radius 
of several meters. Mafia Bay, at one point before the Mafia Marine Park was established, was 
described as a war zone, with blasts going off every hour. Over a period of many years, the 
cumulative effect of such practices can be been devastating. In Tanga, dynamite fishing has 
destroyed 10 percent of reefs completely beyond recovery (Leon and others, 2004).  
Other destructive fishing techniques include beach seine fishing and drag nets, as well as 
the use of sticks and spears. Drag nets are often weighted with chains and sticks are used to hit 
corals and other structures to chase fish into the net. Dragging fish nets over the reef or otherwise 
breaking corals destroys an important habitat for many fish, with such degradation leading to 
secondary effects on the productivity of the standing stock (Jiddawi and Ohman, 2002). The use 
of small mesh nets also results in capture of juveniles, which when conducted intensively in 
nursery areas can deplete fish stocks, alter species composition, leading to loss of biodiversity 
and disruption of food webs.  
Many destructive fishing methods are illegal, but continue to be practiced due to lack of 
enforcement and increased competition for marine resources. About 10 percent of sampled   15
households report using illegal fishing methods, such as spear gun fishing, poison fishing, and 
dynamite fishing. As with any household survey data, there are always concerns that households 
under report illegal activities for fear they or their community may be adversely affected as a 
result. Another reason households may under report these types of illegal fishing activities may 
be related to the frequency they occur. Through discussions with fisher groups and MPA 
management staff on the use of illegal fishing methods, we learned that these methods—
particularly dynamite fishing—tend to be used during specific times of the year (holidays, 
beginning of the school year) when households often need extra cash. As such, households may 
fail to report the use of these illegal fishing methods because they do not normally use them or 
simply because the last time they used such methods falls outside of the recall period.   16
 
 Table 3.  Variety of marine species harvested in Tanzania 
English name   Local name  Representative Species  Habitat  Frequency
  Relative 
Abundance 
Anchovy Uono  Stolephorus  commersonii, 
Encrasicholina punctifer, E. devisi 
Pelagic 12 46 
Sea Catfish  Hongwe  Arius spp.  Estuaries; 
Mangroves 
14 41 
Cobia Songoro  Rachycentron  canadum  Pelagic  12  31 
Crabs Kaa  Scylla  serrata  Estuaries; 
Mangroves 
15 51 
Emperor fish  Changu  Lethrinus spp., Lutjanus spp.  Reef  189  765 
Goatfish Mkundaji  Parupeneus  indicus  Reef  37  105 
Grouper Chewa  Epinephelus  spp.  Reef  35  106 
Lobster  Kambakoche  Panulirus ornatus, P. versicolor, P. 
longipes 
Reef 39  149 
Mackerel Nguru  Scomberomorus  commerson  Pelagic  31  99 
Mackerel Vibua  Rastrelinger  kanagurta  Pelagic  15  53 
Mojarra Chaa  Gerres  spp.  Sandy- 
bottom 
25 81 
Mullet Mkizi  Mugil  cephalus  Pelagic  10  42 
Octopus Pweza  Various Reef  122  491 
Parrotfish Pono  Leptoscarus  spp.  Reef  48  149 
Pompano Kolekole Trachynotus  sp.  Pelagic  109  353 
Rabbit fish  Tasi  Siganus spp.  Reef  105  384 
Ray Taa Rhinoptera  javanica  Reef  40  140 
Sardine Dagaa  Sardinella  gibbosa  Pelagic  33  137 
Sea Cucumber  Jongoo  Holothuria scabra    Reef  32  117 
Shark Papa  Various  Various  36 120 





Shells Komee  Cypraea  tigris,  Cypraeacassis rufa  Beach  8  26 
Snapper   Fimbo  Aprion virescens  Reef  3  15 
Snapper   Kelea + 
Maginge 
Lutjanus spp.  Reef  37  111 
Squid Ngisi   Reef  41 111 
Sweetlips  Komba  Diagramma pictum, Plectorhinchus 
chubbi 
Reef 7  20 
Tuna   Jodari  Euthynnus sp., Thunnus sp.  Pelagic  14  49 
Unicorn fish  Puju  Naso unicornis, N. hexacanthus  Reef  18  51 
Note: The frequency column indicates the number of households that reported normally harvesting that species, in any 
rank. Household ranked up to 5 species they normally harvest, in order of abundance. The relative abundance column 
is the sum of the ranks obtained by each species.   17
 
4.  Empirical Strategy 
 
The main objective of the analysis is to examine the determinants of household choice of 
fishing gear. Fishing households in Tanzania use a variety of fishing gear and catch a variety of 
different fish and other marine products. The empirical model is based on the household 
production framework where households seek to maximize profits from fishing. In the standard 
model, with complete markets, the production decisions of the household are separable from its 
consumption decisions. The household maximizes profits and then maximizes utility subject to a 
standard budget constraint which includes the value of these profits. However, when markets are 
incomplete, as it is likely the case of rural coastal communities in Tanzania, the separation 
property breaks down and production decisions depend on the preferences and endowments of 
the household (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). It is in this context that we specify the empirical model 
for a household’s demand for fishing gear.  
 
Model 
We assume the household’s decision of which fishing gear (G) to use is a function of a 
number of factors. These included fishing related factors (F), household’s livelihood strategies 
(L), household endowments (H), institutional factors (I), village level factors (V), and unobserved 
factors ε. 
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We focus on fishing gear use, rather than ownership, since for most types of fishing gear, 
the proportion of households owning the fishing gear they use is very low. Clearly, if a 
household has invested resources to acquire a specific type of gear, then it will be more likely to 
use it. The empirical estimation of the model accounts for the impact of ownership on choice of 
fishing gear to use, using an instrumental variable approach. We now turn to a discussion of 
other factors hypothesized to influence household choice of fishing gear. 
 
Fishing factors 
The choice of fishing gear to use depends on what the household intends to catch. Some 
types of fishing gear are specifically used to catch a certain type of fish or other marine organism   18
or are used in a specific environment (shallow or deep water). One would not, for example, try to 
use a scoop net to catch a lobster, or set a basket trap in open deep water. Other types of gear, on 
the other hand, are quite versatile—a hand-line can be used from any fishing vessel or from the 
shore, and to fish for a variety of different fish species. Households report on the survey the five 
most important species they catch. These have been grouped into three types of catch: reef fish, 
pelagic fish, and other. Other includes marine species such as sea cucumber, crab, lobster, 
octopus, skid, and shells.  
The choice of fishing gear to use is also influenced by the type of fishing vessel used (if 
any), since that may determine where the household fishes. Households fishing by a dhow or 
engine boat can reach further offshore, whereas households in a dugout or outrigger canoe are 
more restricted. Some households do not use any fishing vessel, but rather fish on foot and are 




Some households are more dependent on fishing as a source of food and income than 
other households and we believe this can influence the choice of fishing gear. Households more 
dependent on fishing may also be more likely to own, and hence use, some types of fishing gear. 
We also consider a household’s food security situation to be an important determinant of fishing 
gear use, with households experiencing less food security being more likely to use destructive 
fishing gear.  
 
Household endowments 
In the context of imperfect markets, household choice of fishing gear may be affected by 
the household’s endowment of human, natural, physical, financial, and social capital. Household 
size, the age and gender of the head of the household, and the education level of household 
members can be thought of as the household’s human capital. Land is one of the most important 
assets for most households—70 percent of all households included in the survey own land, 
whereas 65 percent of those in the sub-sample of households involved in fishing own land. 
Households report the amount of land under different types of crops and the amount of land area 
cultivated  is calculated, taking into account that some land is used for mixed cropping.   19
Ownership and the amount of land cultivated are measures of natural capital at the household’s 
disposition.  
Most households in our sample do not own very many assets, particularly productive 
types of physical capital. For most households in our sample, a handhoe is the only agricultural 
assets they own. Only a handful of households own livestock or transportation equipment which 
could be considered as physical capital. The reported value of all household assets, including 
TVs, radios, household furniture, etc, were summed into one measure of physical capital.  We do 
not include the value of fishing assets in this assets value measure, but treat those assets 
separately, as this is a productive factor important in determining choices regarding fishing gear 
use. Household’s access to financial capital is proxied by whether the household has borrowed 
in the past, whether informally (from family or other sources) or from a credit association. 
Social capital, defined as the quantity and quality of associational life and the related 
social norms, may also influence a household’s decision of which fishing gear to use.
6 
Household membership in various voluntary associations or groups can be used to measure the 
extent or quantity of social capital. To examine the quality aspect of social capital, we consider 
the frequency of households’ participation in village meetings. We expect households involved 
in more community groups and who frequently attend village meetings to be less likely to use 
destructive fishing gear.  
 
Institutional factors 
We do not directly observe MPA patrolling activities which influence household choice 
of fishing gear. MPA dummies are therefore included to control for the different management 
approaches of each MPA, as well as other site specific factors for which we do not have data 
available. However, management activities of MPAs in Tanzania attempt to influence 
household’s fishing behavior in a number of ways. Through education and awareness 
campaigns, MPAs provide households information on the impacts of different fishing gear and 
promote the use of more sustainable fishing methods. MPAs in Tanzania have created a 
                                                 
6 The definition of social capital employed here follows the one of adopted by Narayan and Pritchett (1999) in the 
analysis of the impact of social capital on income of rural households in Tanzania.    20
mechanism, to some degree or another, to involve local communities in the management process 
and create awareness of MPA purposed and objectives.
7  
MPAs, often with technical and financial assistance from NGOs, also promote alternative 
income generating activities (AIGA) to reduce pressure on fisheries resources. A broad range of 
activities fall under these AIGA strategies, some of which are alternatives to fishing (beekeeping, 
tree planting, farming, direct employment in MPA, etc), while others are alternatives to improve 
fishing practices, such as through fishing gear exchanges or loans to acquire specific fishing 
equipment to allow offshore fishing. We expect involvement and awareness of MPA activities, 
and participation in AIGA to positively influence household fishing gear choices.  
 
Other control factors 
The survey design included control  villages that were located outside of the MPAs 
included in the study. In Kilwa, since there is no MPA, all villages are considered control 
villages. This provides a comparison group to evaluate whether MPAs have an impact on 
household fishing gear choice through other means which are not captured in the questions posed 
in the household questionnaire.  
We also examine the impact of household choice of fishing gear on household welfare. If 
destructive fishing gear types are more productive, then one would naturally expect that 
households’ motivation to use such gears is the realization of a higher income. We use per capita 
consumption as a measure of household welfare rather than income, however, as extensive 
experience with household surveys has shown that income data are often more susceptible to 
measurement error and show more variance, due to saving and consumption smoothing behavior 
(Deaton, 1997). We follow the standard specification adopted in many poverty assessments, and 
which has been previously used in a study of rural poverty in Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999). In this framework, consumption is determined by the households endowments of human 
(H), natural (N), social (S), physical (K), and financial (F) capital, and the constraints present in 
their socioeconomic and physical environment (Z). 
                                                 
7 The Tanga Coastal Zone Conservation and Development Program, on one hand, follows a highly decentralized 
model of community based costal management, where communities alone decide on nearly all aspects of fisheries 
management in their area. In other MPAs, such as Misali Island and Menai Bay Conservation Areas, the 
management model involves co-management at three levels, local, district, and national. Households may also be 
involved in the MPA management activities through less formal methods, by attending MPA public meetings. 
   21
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where 
Gh:  denotes the household’s choice of fishing gear; 
Hh:  mean education level of adult males and adult females in the household, household size, 
dependency ratio (number of young and old relative to number of adults), age, gender, and 
education of household head; 
Nh:  whether household owns land and amount of land farmed under various crops; 
Sh:  social capital is measured by the number of groups the household belongs to and 
households’ participation in village assembly meeting; 
Kh:  value of assets owned by household, which includes home assets (televisions, radio, 
furniture, bicycle, etc) and productive assets (tools used for agricultural production, fishing nets 
and boats, etc); 
Fh:  whether household has taken a loan and/or belongs to a savings and credit program; 
Zh:  distance from village to various social services (bus, hospital, markets), village 




The primary goal of the analysis is not so much to explain the household’s choice of a 
particular gear, but rather household’s choices of fishing gear that are particularly 
environmentally destructive. Therefore we classify the different types of gears into two groups: 
destructive and non-destructive fishing gears. Fishing gear is considered environmentally 
destructive if their use results in large amounts of by-catch of non-target species or cause 
degradation of the coastal environment. We classify dynamite, poison, spear guns, gillnets, seine 
nets, drive nets, and shark nets as environmentally destructive fishing gear. Some of the gears 
classified as destructive fishing gear, such as dynamite, poison, spear gun, and beach seining are 
in fact illegal because of their negative environmental impacts. Others, such as gillnets, drive 
nets, and shark nets are not illegal, but their use is regulated due to their potential negative   22
impacts on the environment.
8 For example, fishing nets have to be of a specific mesh size (to 
prevent catch of juvenile species) and their use is often restricted in sensitive habitats—such as 
beaches, coral reefs, and spawning grounds.  
In assessing the potential negative impact of different fishing gears on the environment, 
we rely on information collected during our focus group survey about how these different gears 
are actually used, as well as other studies that have taken place in Tanzania. Evidence suggests 
that there is a lack of compliance with some fishing gear regulations, and some illegal methods 
and gear continue to be used due to lack of enforcement and public awareness (Jiddawi and 
Ohman, 2002). Seine nets of small mesh size are commonly used and dragged on beaches and 
coral reefs, and sometimes even mosquito nets are used (MANREC, 2005; Berachi, 2003). 
Therefore, we classify gillnets, beach seine nets, and drive nets, as destructive fishing gears 
despite their legal status, because the way they are used are likely to cause significant 
environmental damage. This is in addition to illegal fishing gear, such as dynamite and poison, 
which are also considered destructive fishing gear.
9   
Environmentally non-destructive fishing gear, on the other hand, are the types of fishing 
gear that are selective in catching the targeted species and do not result in large amounts of by-
catch or result in negative impacts on marine habitats. We classify scoop nets, cast nets, ring 
nets, traps, fences, and hook and line fishing, as environmentally non-destructive fishing gear. As 
with the classification of environmentally destructive fishing gear, determining which types of 
gear are less destructive and belong in the non-destructive fishing gear category involves some 
judgment about how these gears are actually used in practice. Most of these gears we classify as 
non-destructive have traditionally been used by local fishermen. While they may generate some 
negative environmental impacts if used carelessly or by too many fishermen, the gears by 
themselves do not generate substantial habitat destruction. 
                                                 
8 The FAO’s Fisheries Global Information System contains detailed fishing gear type fact sheets, which includes a 
description of the fishing gear, how it is used, and an assessment of the gear’s impact on the catch of juveniles and 
other species and the marine environment.  
9 We should note that dynamite and poison fishing are likely underreported in our survey. We believe this is case for 
two reasons. First, households may be less likely to report they use these methods simply because these are known 
to illegal activities. Second, dynamite use is very seasonal. Marine park police report that use of dynamite fishing 
increases at specific times of the year—such as when school fees are due or during particular holidays, when 
households may be in need of extra cash. The timing of our survey and recall period of one month would therefore 
miss this type of sporadic use.     23
Let  1 = y  represent a household’s use of environmentally destructive fishing gear and 
0 = y  the use of non-destructive fishing gear. We can estimate the probability a household 
chooses to use environmentally destructive fishing gear, which is given by:  
 
(3)  Prob  ) ( ) 1 (
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Where  Φ represents the cumulative normal standard distribution and  i x  the vector of 
independent variables, fishing related factors, household’s livelihood strategies and endowments, 
institutional factors, village factors, discussed earlier. 
However, we should consider the possibility that the household’s choice of fishing gear 
and type of fish to catch may be simultaneously determined. Results of the factor analysis of 
fishing technology and target species for households involved in fishing shows that a high 
proportion of the variation in fishing characteristics falls into logical groupings, in terms of 
reliance on near shore resources and use of specific fishing technology. This suggests decisions 
concerning where to fish, what type of species to target, and gear used are closely linked. In this 
case, we would then have to specify the following model: 
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Where  1 y  denotes the choice of fish to target (pelagic or reef) and  2 y  denotes the choice of 
fishing gear. We estimate this structural model as a bivariate probit model and test the hypothesis 
that the choice of fishing gear and target fish species are simultaneously made by households. 
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The correlation coefficient ρ  accounts for the possibility that these two decisions are 
simultaneously made by households, hence we test the hypothesis that  0 = ρ .
10 
We also estimate a reduced form univariate probit model, which allows direct estimation 
of the impact of fish target species on the probability of using destructive fishing gear. In order to 
ensure logical consistency (so as to ensure that probabilities sum to one), we consider the model 
where  0 1 = β .
11 We can then specify the following reduced form equation: 
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  This formulation of the model can also be estimated using the probit maximum likelihood 
estimator (MLE) and results in consistent estimates of equation (7) parameters (Maddala, 
1983).
12 
Equation (2) is first estimated by the standard OLS method adopted in poverty analysis. 
We also estimate the determinants of consumption using a MLE, since some of the variables 
which determine the choice of fishing gear may also determine household consumption. The 
MLE directly controls for the part of the error term in equation (2) which is correlated with 
household’s choice of fishing gear.
13   
 
                                                 
10 If  0 = ρ , then the sum of the log likelihoods of probit estimation of equations (3) and (4) will equal the log 
likelihood of bivariate probit model.  
11 We must assume that either  1 β  or  2 β  be equal to zero to specify a univariate probit equation. This is known as 
an identifiability condition, necessary to estimate all parameters in equation (7). For a full discussion of these 
conditions and other assumptions necessary identify and estimate simultaneous equation models, see Maddala 
(1983). 
12 If u1 and u2 are independent, then one can estimate both equations separately using a probit ML method. If u1 and 
u2 are not independent, the two stage method, in which we first obtain the probit ML estimates of  1 ˆ γ  of  1 γ  and then 
substitute  ) , ˆ ( 1
'
1 x γ Φ  for 
*
1 y , does not give consistent estimates of the parameters. To be conservative, we do not 
assume the error terms are independent but rather employ the substitution of  ) , ( 1
'
1 x γ Φ  for  1
~ y   which Maddala 
(1983) shows results in consistent estimates of the model’s parameters. 
13 The MLE uses a two step iterative procedure. In the first step the part of the error term which is correlated with 
the choice of fishing gear is estimated using a probit model. Household consumption is estimated in the second step, 
with a correction for the effect of the choice of fishing gear. The error term in the second step estimation of equation 
(2) is therefore not correlated with the choice of fishing gear.   25
Estimation issues 
 
In addition to the potential simultaneous determination of fishing gear used and the 
choice of fish to target, and the impact of the choice of fishing gear on household consumption 
levels, we must also address the implications of the survey design and possible endogenous 
variables in the econometric estimation of the models in equations (2) - (9).  
Because the survey design sampled clusters of households in a given village, it violates 
the assumption of independent observations. Households in a given cluster are more likely to be 
similar to one another in some respects than households in different clusters. For example, 
households in a given village may face similar constraints, such as a heavily degraded reef 
fisheries or not being able to access a particular type of fisheries due to geographical constraints. 
The error terms in the regression ignoring the cluster effect will be correlated across observations 
in the same cluster, and hence the efficiency of the coefficients estimated will be affected 
(Deaton, 1997).  Ignoring the cluster effect increases the variability of standard error estimates 
compared with a simple random sampling design. However, the model can be estimated using 
appropriate statistical techniques. These will estimate the β vector that maximizes the likelihood 
function that we would have if we had data on all individuals in the population. The variance 
estimates are computed as if the sample was drawn again and again using the same clustering 
scheme and the estimated β vector computed as the maximum of the “pseudo-likelihood” 
function.
14  
Inclusion of household’s ownership of fishing gear as an explanatory variable can 
potentially bias the estimated coefficients. Household’s ownership of fishing gear may be 
endogenously determined by household’s characteristics—livelihood strategies and 
endowments—in which case, the error terms in the regression will be correlated with the 
ownership variable. If this correlation between the error term and one of the explanatory 
variables is not controlled for in the estimation procedure, then estimated coefficients could be 
biased. Table A2, in the annex, presents the results of different model specifications tried to 
control for the impact of ownership. We chose an instrumental variables approach to address this 
potential endogeneity problem. Village level variables and factor analysis scores for household’s 
                                                 
14 The STATA 7.0 manual contains a more detailed discussion of the survey estimation commands that can be used 
in this case.    26
wealth and fishery characteristics that are excluded from the bivariate and univariate probit 
analysis are used as instruments to predict ownership of fishing gear. Such variables are 
significant predictors of household ownership of fishing gear, but do not add significantly to the 
prediction of fishing gear use after controlling for the other variables that are included in the 
model.  
 
5.  Results 
 
The results of the analysis of household’s use of destructive fishing gear are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5. We first report the results for the estimation of equations (4) and (5), using a 
bivariate probit model for the simultaneous choice of fishing gear and targeting of reef and 
pelagic species. These results are presented in Table 4. In principle, a multivariate probit model 
that accounts for the simultaneous decision of targeting reef species, pelagic species, and use of 
destructive fishing gear, would be just an extension of the bivariate probit model. However, the 
practical obstacle to estimating such a multivariate probit model is the evaluation of higher order 
multivariate normal integrals. Existing techniques do not allow accurate and efficient evaluation 
for more than two variables, even in a sample of moderate size (Greene, 1997). Since some 
households report catch of both reef and pelagic species, we estimated separately the choice of 
fishing gear for reef and pelagic species.  
The results of the bivariate models for reef and pelagic species are broadly consistent and 
most of the variables statistically significant as determinants of use of destructive fishing gear for 
reef species (column I) are also statistically significant in the use of destructive fishing gear for 
pelagic species (column III). We reject the hypothesis that the choice of fishing gear used is 
independent of targeting reef species. In other words, there is a degree of correlation between the 
choice of fishing gear used and the probability of fishing for reef species, suggesting these 
decisions are jointly made. As for pelagic species, the choice of fishing gear is independently 
made of the choice to fish pelagic species. We now discuss the impact of specific variables on 
the probability of using destructive fishing gear.   
Ownership is an important determinant of destructive fishing gear use. Accounting for 
the impact of ownership also has an impact on the estimated coefficient of other fishing related 
factors. In general, failure to account for the impact of ownership overstates the magnitude of the   27
impact of other fishing related factors (see Table A2). Households that do not own their fishing 
gear, but rather “rent” the gear they use, also have a positive probability of using destructive 
fishing gear.
 15 However, the impact of ownership on use of destructive fishing gear is larger than 
if the gear is rented.  
Households that use an outrigger or dugout canoe are significantly more likely to use 
destructive fishing gear. Households using canoes have a slightly higher probability of fishing 
reef species, whereas households using larger boats have a slightly higher probability of fishing 
pelagic species. This makes sense, and confirms fishermen’s statements that they lack equipment 
to fish further offshore, thereby putting increasing pressure on near shore fisheries resources. The 
higher probability of using destructive fishing gear when fishing for reef species in near shore 
waters is likely to exacerbate the pressure on near shore fisheries. Once we control for ownership 
of fishing gear, households dependent on fishing as a primary source of income are no more 
likely to use destructive fishing gear as other households also engaged in fishing. Household 
more dependent on fishing, however, are more likely to target pelagic species.  
Results regarding household characteristics suggest that some aspects of poverty may 
contribute to environmental degradation. Households able to satisfy their normal diet most of the 
time during the past year are significantly less likely to use destructive fishing gear. This result 
could be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that poverty leads to environmental 
degradation—at least extreme poverty, as measured by a household’s inability to achieve food 
security. Larger household and female headed households, who are generally poorer, are also 
more likely to use destructive fishing gear.
16 Higher mean male education reduces the probability 
a household uses destructive fishing gear, although the coefficient on this variable is rather small. 
Female education is not a significant determinant of choice of fishing gear. Wealthier 
households, in terms of value of physical assets, are less likely to use destructive fishing gear. 
Access to credit, on the other hand, increases the probability of using destructive fishing gear. 
Land ownership and the amount of land cultivated are not significant determinants of the use of 
destructive fishing gear.  
                                                 
15 Individuals may rent fishing gear for a fee, or, as it is more often the case, use fishing gear provided by a fish 
trader subject to an agreement to sell all or most of its catch to the trader at an agreed below market price.  
16 From our survey questionnaire, we cannot determine which household member uses a particular type of fishing 
gear. Therefore the finding that female households are more likely to use destructive fishing gear does not imply that 
females are more likely to use destructive gear. In Tanzania, females are generally not directly involve in fishing, 
other than collecting seashells, sea cucumbers, and octopus for a few hours a day during the spring tides.    28
Households living in a village inside a MPA are significantly less likely to fish for reef 
species. This suggests that MPA restrictions may be effective in determining the location of 
fishing activities However, village location inside the MPA has no direct impact on the choice of 
fishing gear. It is possible that MPAs’ impact on fishing gear occurs indirectly, for example, by 
supporting AIGA. These programs often support fishing gear exchange programs, as well as 
diversification of income generating activities away from fishing. We find that AIGA reduce the 
probability that households use destructive fishing gear. Together these results would suggest 
that MPAs may be reducing pressure on near shore fisheries, at least to the extent that they 
influence the location of fishing for households living within their boundaries and the choice of 
fishing gear for those participating in AIGA. Awareness of MPA objectives and purpose of 
management activities does not have a significant impact on choice of fishing gear and species 
targeted.  
Next we discuss the results of estimating equation (7), the reduced form univariate probit 
model of the use of destructive fishing gear. These results are presented in Table 5. The reduced 
form model presented in equation (7) is estimated based on the results of the bivariate probit 
mode, which suggests that the choice of gear to use and the choice to fish reef species are 
simultaneously made. Therefore, the reduced form model estimated takes into account the 
correlation between the use of destructive fishing gear and targeting of reef species. Most of the 
coefficients reported in Table of 5 are very close to the results reported earlier for the bivariate 
instrumental variable probit model. This suggests that the inclusion of the predicted probabilities 
for reef species do not bias the coefficients of the other explanatory variables.  
One of the benefits of estimating the reduced form univariate probit model is that we can 
calculate the marginal probabilities associated with each of the explanatory variables and 
compare the impact changes in these variables on the probability a household uses destructive 
fishing gear. As the results reported in Table 5 confirm, the most important determinant of 
whether a household uses destructive fishing gear is ownership of such gear. A household that 
owns destructive fishing gear is 89 percent more likely to use such gear than households that 
does not own destructive fishing gear. Households that do not own the fishing gear they use, but 
rather rent such gear, are only 54 percent more likely to use destructive fishing gear. These 
results suggest that policies to enforce existing fishing gear regulations that ban the use of these   29
destructive fishing gears and facilitate the ownership of less destructive fishing gear (such as 
gear exchange programs) are likely to have the most impact in the use of destructive fishing gear.  
Households that fish reef species are four times more likely to use destructive fishing 
gear (20 percent) than households fishing for pelagic species (5 percent). However, we should 
note that the coefficient on the pelagic variable is not statistically significant. Although the 
probability of using destructive fishing gear is nearly the same for households using large boats 
and those using canoes, only the use of a canoe is a statistically significant determinant of the use 
destructive fishing gear.  Given that households using canoes are more likely to fish in the near 
shore waters and target reef species, this may suggest that pressure on near shore fisheries 
resources is further exacerbated by lack of equipment to reach further offshore.  
Female headed households are frequently the poorest and most dependent on near shore 
resources as an important source of food and income. Women in Tanzania generally do not 
participate directly in fishing, but rather are involved in the collection of seashells, sea cucumber, 
and octopus, for a few hours a day during the spring tides. Although we cannot distinguish which 
household members use which gears, our results show that female headed households are 26 
percent more likely to use destructive fishing gear. Achieving food security reduces the 
probability that a household uses destructive fishing gear by 10 percent. Other variables, such as 
male education, value of physical assets, are also significant determinants of destructive fishing 
gear use. Their negative coefficient suggests that wealthier, more educated households are less 
likely to use destructive fishing gear. However, the magnitude of the impact of male education 
and value of assets is relatively small. Still, these results would tend to support the hypothesis 
that poverty may lead to environmental degradation. However, in contrast, access to credit 
increases the probability of using destructive fishing gear by 10 percent. The relationship 
between different aspects of poverty and the use destructive fishing gear is thus complicated.  
Household participation in AIGA has a surprisingly large impact on household choice of 
fishing gear—reducing the probability of use of destructive fishing gear by 13 percent. 
Promotion of AIGA is often viewed as an essential instrument to achieve conservation objectives 
in MPAs, by addressing the poverty related root causes that may be the driving force behind 
some of the habitat degradation in coastal areas. Directly measuring the success of such 
measures on reducing habitat degradation is often difficult. This result suggests that MPA   30
supported activities in Tanzania that provide incentives for households to develop AIGA do 
influence household fishing gear choice. The proportion of households participating in these 
AIGA amounts to 16.5 percent of households living in MPA villages. Unfortunately the survey 
does not provide any detailed information on what type of AIGA the household is involved. We 
do not find any significant impact of household awareness of MPA affairs or whether the 
household lives in a village inside a MPA.  
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Table 4: Bivariate probit model of the use of destructive fishing gear 
 
Use Destructive 








Variables   Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors  Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors  Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors  Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Own destructive fishing gear (IV 
estimate) 4.484***  0.535  1.842***  0.389  4.590***  0.579  0.294  0.341 
Rent fishing gear  1.727***  0.232  0.287  0.330  1.741***  0.236  0.534**  0.249 
Large boat/dhow  0.515  0.320  0.817***  0.222  0.458  0.321  1.139***  0.305 
Outrigger or dugout canoe  0.567***  0.192  1.184***  0.209  0.523***  0.199  1.077***  0.250 
Fishing primary activity  0.174  0.244  0.281  0.185  0.150  0.250  0.474**  0.222 
Food secure  -0.404**  0.211  -0.114  0.256  -0.398*  0.245  -0.259*  0.155 
Household size  0.074**  0.028  0.006  0.033  0.068**  0.025  -0.020  0.034 
Female head of household  0.883***  0.228  -0.357  0.393  0.900***  0.245  -0.176  0.397 
Mean male education  -0.073**  0.037  0.020  0.023  -0.077**  0.037  -0.006  0.029 
Mean female education  0.042  0.029  -0.017  0.026  0.046  0.028  -0.024  0.025 
Own land  -0.231  0.276  -0.111  0.201  -0.249  0.277  -0.099  0.123 
Land area cultivated  -0.002  0.026  0.008  0.018  -0.011  0.025  0.029*  0.017 
Access to credit  0.465**  0.229  0.250*  0.141  0.439**  0.218  -0.064  0.179 









Participates in village meetings  0.098  0.064  -0.004  0.043  0.101  0.066  -0.166***  0.058 
Participates in AIGA  -0.993***  0.330  0.203  0.193  -0.978***  0.318  0.248  0.263 
Aware of MPA affairs  -0.054  0.213  0.145  0.213  -0.055  0.191  -0.091  0.193 
MPA village  0.189  0.201  -0.399***  0.163  0.201  0.201  -0.181  0.131 
                
Observations 655    655    655    655   
Log likelihood     -5337        -5156       
Wald test of rho=0:          chi
2(1)  =  5.08; Prob > chi
2  =  0.02  chi
2(1)  =  1.15; Prob > chi
2  =  0.28 
Notes: 
 *** , **, * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence interval, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering effect 
Coefficient for dummy variables for each of the MPAs and constant not reported 
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Table 5: Reduced form probit model of the use of destructive fishing gear 
  Use Destructive Fishing Gear 
Independent 
Variables  Coefficients Standard  Errors 
Marginal  
Probabilities 
Own destructive gear (IV)  4.463***  0.561  0.89*** 
Rent fishing gear  1.675***  0.244  0.54*** 
Fish reef species  0.932**  0.395  0.20*** 
Fish pelagic species  0.274  0.267  0.05 
Large boat/dhow  0.130  0.344  0.03 
Outrigger or dugout canoe  0.058**  0.028  0.02** 
Fishing primary activity  0.004  0.267  -0.01 
Food secure  -0.424**  0.223  -0.10** 
Household size  0.080**  0.042  0.02** 
Female head of household  0.900***  0.255  0.26*** 
Mean male education  -0.077**  0.038  -0.02** 
Mean female education  0.041  0.027  0.01 
Own land  -0.246  0.275  -0.05 
Land area cultivated  -0.005  0.023  -0.00 
Value of physical assets  -3.93e
-07** 1.62e
-07 -0.00** 
Access to credit  0.433**  0.199  0.10** 
Participates in meetings  0.116*  0.068  0.02* 
Participates in AIGA  -1.032***  0.311  -0.13*** 
Aware of MPA  0.025  0.179  -0.01 
MPA village  -0.320  0.198  -0.06 
      
Observations 655    655 
R Squared/Log likelihood     0.5931  -155.17   
Notes: 
 *** , **, * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence interval, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering effect 
Coefficient for dummy variables for each of the MPAs and constant not reported 
For continuous variables, marginal probabilities measure the marginal change in probability at the 
variable’s mean. For discrete variables, the marginal probabilities should be interpreted as the 
change in probability for a change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Table 6 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2), the consumption 
equation.
17 We first estimate equation (2) by OLS, using the standard specification adopted in 
these types of poverty analysis. We find that larger households, households with a higher ratio 
of dependents to working adults, and households headed by a female have lower consumption 
levels. Households with an older head also have lower consumption levels, although this 
effect diminishes as the household head ages. The average household head is 44 years old. 
The education level of the head of household head matters. Literacy in Kiswahili or English is 
positively correlated with household consumption. Surprisingly, however, the education 
levels of other household members do not show a significant impact on household 
consumption.  
Households primarily dependent on farming for income generation have significantly 
lower levels of consumption than households in other sectors. This result is consistent with 
the finding of the analysis of the national 2000/01 Household Budget Survey (HBS), which 
shows that poverty is highest among farming households (NBS, 2002). Households primarily 
dependent on fishing for income generation are neither worse off nor better off, in terms of 
consumption levels, than households in other occupations. Rural households depend on a 
variety of income sources. After controlling for household size and number of productive 
adults relative to the number of dependents, the results on Table 6 show that having such a 
diversified income base increases household consumption levels. This finding is also 
consistent with findings of the 2000/01 national HBS. However, nationally 65 percent of 
households report 3 or more income sources. In our sample of the coastal population, only 
about half of the households surveyed report having 3 or more income sources. Providing 
opportunities for income diversification along the coast should therefore increase 
consumption levels and reduce poverty.  
Households with more assets also have higher consumption levels, despite the very 
low level of ownership of productive assets. Surprisingly, land ownership and the amount of 
land farmed do not significantly impact household consumption. Despite experimenting with 
several alternative measures for social capital, in general, social capital does appear to have a 
                                                 
17 We do not report results with village distance variables as in nearly all instances these variables were 
statistically insignificant. We drop the distance variables from the analysis because missing distance data for 
some villages resulted in a large number of observations being excluded from the analysis.    34
significant influence on household consumption levels. The frequency of household’s 
participation in village meetings is statistically significant in the OLS model, but only at the 
10 percent level.  
The comparison between households living in an MPA village and those living outside 
an MPA area show that households in the MPA villages have, on average, lower consumption 
levels. That is not to say that MPAs cause lower levels of consumption, since these 
households might have had lower consumption levels perhaps even before the MPAs were 
established. Other characteristics of these villages which are not accounted for in the model 
estimated could also be partly driving this result. However, this finding does raise enough 
concern so that the impact of MPAs on household consumption and other household welfare 
measures should be investigated further.  
The results discussed above remain consistent in the other specifications of the 
consumption equation (2) reported on Table 6, which explore the impact of the use of 
destructive fishing gear on households’ consumption levels. However, the OLS results and 
MLE results lead to very different conclusions regarding the impact of the use of destructive 
fishing gear. When the consumption equation is estimated by OLS and includes the choice of 
fishing gear, the use of destructive fishing gear has no significant impact on household’s 
consumption levels. This is the case in the OLS model even if we restrict the sample to 
fishing households only. But we know from the earlier results (Tables 4 and 5) that the use of 
destructive fishing gear is at least partly determined by some of the exogenous variables 
included in the consumption equation. In other words, the use of destructive fishing gear is 
endogenously determined.  
If individuals choose whether or not to use destructive fishing gear and the error term 
of the model that gives rise to this choice is correlated with the error term in the consumption 
equation, then we can expect that the OLS estimate of the impact of the use of destructive 
gear on consumption to be biased. The MLE adopts an iterative estimation procedure which 
corrects for the correlation between the use of destructive fishing gear and error term in the 
consumption equation. Thus the MLE provides a consistent (or unbiased) estimate of the 
impact of the use of destructive fishing gear on household consumption (Maddala, 1983). As 
the results on Table 6 shows, the MLE estimate of the impact on household consumption of   35
the use of destructive fishing gear is about twice as large as the OLS estimate. The downward 
bias in the coefficient on the use of destructive fishing gear in the OLS model suggests there 
is a negative correlation between household consumption and the use of destructive fishing 
gear. Correcting this bias with the MLE, we reject the hypothesis that the use of destructive 
fishing gear has no impact on household consumption. The MLE estimate of the impact of the 
use of destructive fishing gear suggests that, holding all other factors constant, is to increase 
household consumption by 7 percent. 
The correlation of the error terms in equation (2) and equation (8) is not strong enough 
to reject the hypothesis that the two error terms are uncorrelated. However, the amount of 
correlation between the two error terms is enough to bias the coefficient of the use of 
destructive fishing gear and render it statistically insignificant in the OLS equation. In a way, 
this result suggests that although household consumption is determined independently of the 
choice of fishing gear, there is still a small “income effect” for those that use destructive 
fishing gear. If there were no such correlation two error terms, the MLE and the OLS methods 







Table 6: Determinants of household consumption 
  OLS (I)  OLS (II)  MLE (III) 
Independent  
Variables   Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors  Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors  Coefficients 
Standard 
Errors 
Uses destructive fishing gear          0.028  0.033  0.074**  0.031 
Household  size  -0.084***  0.013 -0.085***  0.013 -0.086***  0.013 
Dependent  ratio  -0.275***  0.093 -0.272***  0.093 -0.276***  0.093 
Female head of household  -0.215**  0.090  -0.221**  0.090  -0.229***  0.092 
Household  head’s  age  -0.022**  0.009 -0.023**  0.008 -0.022***  0.008 
Head’s  age  squared  0.000**  0.000 0.000**  0.000 0.000**  0.000 
Household  head  literate  0.105**  0.049 0.102**  0.044 0.099**  0.042 
Mean male education  0.001  0.006  0.001  0.006  0.001  0.006 
Mean female education  -0.004  0.005  -0.004  0.005  -0.005  0.005 
Farmer  -0.148**  0.059 -0.150**  0.059 -0.152***  0.059 
Fisher  -0.055  0.062 -0.064  0.064 -0.079  0.063 
Employed  0.050  0.053 0.047  0.054 0.042  0.055 
Number of income sources  0.040***  0.014  0.039***  0.014  0.040***  0.014 
Access to credit  -0.111  0.075  -0.114  0.074  -0.116  0.073 
Own  land  0.068  0.062 0.068  0.063 0.069  0.063 










Participates in village meetings  0.026*  0.015  0.024*  0.015  0.023  0.015 
Participates  in  AIGA  0.018  0.072 0.020  0.072 0.022  0.073 
MPA  village  -0.125***  0.029 -0.121***  0.031 -0.114***  0.031 
           
Observations 648    648    648   
R Square/ Log likelihood   
  34.75    34.79    -6411   
Notes: 
 *** , **, * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence interval, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering effect 
Coefficient for dummy variables for each of the MPAs and constant not reported 37 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In many tropical developing countries poverty is believed to be the main driving force 
behind the degradation of marine and coastal environment. There is also concern that if 
policies adopted to address degradation of these resources do not take into consideration the 
poverty issues, they will be less likely to be effective and lead to greater poverty and 
marginalized livelihoods for those that depend on these resources. Using household survey 
data from coastal areas of Tanzania, this paper examines the linkages between poverty, MPA 
management activities and household use of destructive fishing gear. Our goal is to 
understand whether poverty contributes to the use of destructive fishing gear and how MPA 
activities impact household choice of fishing gear and household welfare.  
While we cannot establish a direct link between income poverty and the use of 
destructive fishing gear, we do find that some aspects of poverty contribute to the use of 
destructive fishing gear. Poverty has many different dimensions, and hence we examine a 
number of measures of poverty in the analysis to understand how different aspects of poverty 
affect household fishing gear use. We find that food insecure households and female headed 
households are more likely to use destructive fishing gear. Higher levels of male education 
and higher asset wealth, on the other hand, decrease the probability that households use 
destructive fishing gear. 
We also find that ownership of fishing gear matters. Households that own destructive 
fishing gear are virtually certain to use such gear. However, more than two-thirds of fishing 
households do not own the fishing gear they use. These households are only slightly more 
likely to use destructive fishing gear than not. Most of the fishing gear we classified as 
destructive also happens to be illegal. Enforcement of existing regulations banning the use of 
the illegal fishing gear is clearly important, but so is perhaps a policy that confiscates illegal 
gear. Fines and other types of punishment may do little to deter the use of illegal gear, 
particularly when the illegal fishing gear can be rented out. For other destructive fishing gear 
that is not illegal, a gear exchange program might be considered. Some MPAs in Tanzania do 
in fact already have such gear exchange programs, which are facilitating the exchange of 
destructive fishing gear for more environmentally sustainable fishing gear. Households that 
use destructive fishing gear do appear to benefit from it, at least to some degree, in terms of   38
higher household consumption. Therefore incentives are also needed to dissuade the use of 
such gear, in addition to stricter enforcement of existing regulations.  
An interesting finding of our analysis shows that households participating in AIGA 
promoted by MPAs are less likely to use destructive fishing gear. This is an encouraging 
result given that MPAs in Tanzania support a broad range of AIGA, aimed at reducing 
pressure on fisheries through the development of new activities, as well as activities to 
improve the sustainability of fishing practices. We also find that households living in MPA 
villages are less likely to target near shore reef species. Whether these impacts are sufficiently 
large to generate desired environmental outcomes and whether they would hold if resources 
were available to expand such AIGA are clearly important questions to be considered. Further 
analysis with relevant environmental indicators would be needed to determine to what extent 
MPA management activities contribute to lower pressure on coastal resources in these areas. 
MPA management policies restrict access to fishing in some areas, and this may have 
an adverse impact on households dependent on fishing for their livelihoods. At the same time, 
other economic opportunities may arise as a result of MPA activities. Our data suggest that 
the proportion of households employed in non-fishing and non-farming activities are two to 
three times higher for MPA villages than for non-MPA villages. We do not find any evidence 
that fishing households in general, or fishing households in MPA areas, are worse off 
compared to other occupations. This is reassuring. However, households residing in MPA 
villages have lower levels of consumption compared to households in non-MPA villages, after 
controlling for impact of other factors that determine household consumption. We cannot 
attribute the lower levels of consumption to the establishment of MPAs, since we do not have 
baseline data to compare the difference in household consumption levels between MPA 
villages and non-MPA villages prior to the establishment of MPAs. Other important factors, 
which were not captured by our survey instrument, may need to be investigated to draw more 
definitive conclusions regarding the welfare impact of MPAs on coastal communities.  




Table A.1: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Error  Min Max 
Use destructive fishing gear  0.24  0.04  0  1 
Own destructive fishing gear  0.16  0.03  0  1 
Fish pelagic species  0.21  0.03  0  1 
Fish reef species  0.34  0.05  0  1 
Rent fishing gear  0.12  0.03  0  1 
Fishing primary activity  0.32  0.04  0  1 
Number of income sources  2.44  0.21  0  10 
Food secure  0.80  0.03  0  1 
Household size  5.89  0.31  1  11 
Female head of household  0.10  0.02  0  1 
Mean male education (years)  5.53  0.47  0  18 
Mean female education (years)  4.69  0.39  0  15 
Own land  0.70  0.06  0  1 
Land area cultivated (acres)  2.18  0.32  0  40 
Access to credit  0.22  0.06  0  1 
Value of physical assets (Tsh)  324,464  29,702  0  1.09e 
07 
MPA village  0.67  0.12  0  1 
Participates in AIGA  0.11  0.03  0  1 
Involved in MPA affairs  0.29  0.05  0  1 
Distance to nearest market (km)  1.18  0.51  0  5 40 
Table A2: The impact of fishing gear ownership on destructive fishing gear use 
 
Use Destructive  
Fishing Gear (I) 
Use Destructive  
Fishing Gear (II) 
Use Destructive  
Fishing Gear 
(IV Probit Model) 
Independent  







Own destructive fishing gear       4.651***  0.599  4.484***  0.535 
Rent  fishing  gear  1.274*** 0.196  3.377*** 0.520  1.727*** 0.232 
Large boat/dhow  0.964***  0.270  0.999  0.757  0.515  0.320 
Outrigger or dugout canoe  1.010***  0.166  1.070***  0.230  0.567***  0.192 
Fishing primary activity  0.602***  0.214  0.017  0.233  0.174  0.244 
Food secure  -0.437***  0.169  -0.175  0.222  -0.404**  0.211 
Household size  0.084***  0.018  0.007  0.044  0.074**  0.028 
Female head of household  0.671***  0.200  0.445  0.350  0.883***  0.228 
Mean male education  -0.039  0.027  -0.086  0.062  -0.073**  0.037 
Mean female education  0.022  0.019  0.068  0.043  0.042  0.029 
Own  land  -0.017 0.238 -0.422 0.341  -0.231 0.276 
Land area cultivated  0.013  0.027  -0.024  0.040  -0.002  0.026 
Access to credit  0.379**  0.164  0.335*  0.184  0.465**  0.229 







Participates in village meetings  0.053  0.053  0.048  0.089  0.098  0.064 
Participates in AIGA  -0.385*  0.227  -1.117**  0.538  -0.993***  0.330 
Aware of MPA affairs  0.194  0.179  -0.241  0.286  -0.054  0.213 
MPA  village  -0.456 0.455 -0.319 0.377 0.189 0.201 
         
Observations 655    655    655   
Log pseudo-likelihood     -242.79    -68.38    -151.58   
Notes: *** , **, * indicate significance at the 99, 95, and 90 percent confidence interval, respectively 
Robust standard errors reported, adjusted for clustering effect 
Coefficient for dummy variables for each of the MPAs and constant not reported 
 
When we omit the ownership of fishing gear from the analysis (column I), the results suggest 
that fishing related factors, as well as some household characteristics, are important determinants 
of the use of destructive fishing gear. In particular, households primarily dependent on fishing 
for income generation are significantly more likely to use destructive fishing gear. Ownership of 
any type of fishing gear is likely to be correlated with the use of other fishing inputs, such as 
boats and canoes. Households that dependent mostly on fishing may also be the ones more likely 
to own fishing gear. Once we control for ownership of destructive fishing gear, households 
dependent on fishing are not significantly more likely to use destructive fishing gear. Not 
surprisingly, the large coefficient on the ownership variable does suggest that if households own 
such destructive gear, they are very likely to use it. This suggests that failing to account for the 
impact of ownership generates biased coefficients in the simple probit model41 
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